The 1/3 Rule
Tuesday, June 28, 2011 at 12:01AM | Mary Kaszynski In the past thirty years, the defense budget has gone through two buildups (the Reagan years and post-9/11) and one build-down (after the Cold War.) Despite fluctuating toplines, however, the services’ percent share of the budget has remained roughly equal.
The one-third per service breakdown isn’t exact, although nearly all discrepancies can be derived from more dramatic changes to the fourth component of the defense budget—Defense-wide. Nonetheless, the consistency of the trend over the past thirty years is certainly remarkable.
Whether splitting the budget equally among the services makes strategic sense is questionable. As we reevaluate defense priorities, and tailor the force structure to match those priorities, reconsidering the budget breakdown will be critical.
Source: DOD Comptroller FY 2012 Budget Briefing Book, Tables 2-1 and 6-10
Reader Comments (3)
Why ignore over $1 trillion in wartime supplemental budgets? If one includes ALL the spending, the ratios clearly change depending on the employment of the armed forces. During periods of relative peace, the Army always has the smallest share; during periods of hot war, the Army often has the largest share.
Also, the comment "nearly all discrepancies can be derived from more dramatic changes to the fourth component of the defense budget—Defense-wide" is somewhat misleading. The mostly-overhead defense-wide portion has grown steadily and dramatically in the last few decades.
Including everything, one actually sees a good deal of variation:
1970: Army 32%, Navy 30%, Air Force 32%, Defense-wide 7%
2000: Army 26%, Navy 31%, Air Force 29%, Defense-wide 15%
2010: Army 33%, Navy 26%, Air Force 24%, Defense-wide 18%
Yes, history has shown defense budget allocations among the three military departments are virtually immune to rising and declining budgets. Less readily recognized is the continuous growth of Defense-wide appropriations, the locus of funding for policy and support entities, the military health system, common information services and systems sustainment, contracts, family support programs, administrative functions for the military services, as well as combat support agencies, and the activities of intelligence agencies and the Special Operations Command.
According to the National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2012, Defense-wide appropriations rose from 6.5 percent in FY1970 to 12.5% in FY1980, amidst a substantive decline in overall defense spending during the same time. During the subsequent Reagan Administration buildup, overall Defense-wide appropriations amounts declined, returning to the 6 percent range by FY1990. As the Cold War wound down between FY1990 and 1992, Defense-wide appropriations again rose as a proportion, climbing 5 percentage points over three years as declining defense budgets returned. Fast forward a decade and Defense-wide appropriations peaked at 15.4 percent of the overall defense budget in FY2000, even though total appropriations had declined over 100 hundred billion dollars during that period.
By FY2002, the year immediately following the September 11 attacks, Defense-wide appropriations grew by 30 billion dollars, a level equivalent to all of the three military departments combined, and comprising an all-time peak of 19.7 percent. The rush to fund the military for the global war on terrorism immediately reduced this proportion over the next decade, but it never fell below 14 percent.
According to FY2012 budget projections, Defense-wide appropriations will never fall below 18 percent through FY2016.
http://houseofmarathon.blogspot.com/2011/06/110608theconstantadversary.html
Service shares are hardly a critical issue. They have just "happened" over time as the U.S. made its decisions as to what capabilities to retain in U.S. forces after World War II and even after the Cold War. It should be noted that "the Navy" includes the Marine Corps, and that the Air Force share includes a lot of the black programs for NRO, as well as providing the satellite communications, the airlift, and the air-refueling tankers that serve the Army and Navy. In short, we have legacy forces to sustain -- they're really super forces -- and there is no clear strategic reason to go to some wild zero construct in order to disband some forces while icnreasing others. To be sure, "after" Afghanistan, whenever that is, there will be a large reduction in ground forces personnel (Army and Marines) -- at least 92,000, probably more. But the U.S. will take those savings; it will not mean more money for Navy and Air Force, even if their "shares" go up. Much ado about nothing.