Scaling Back the Overmatch

Amidst hyperbolic language about the effect sequestration would have on national security, General Martin Dempsey’s commentary in Congressional testimony last week sounded much more measured: 

We would go from being unquestionably powerful everywhere to being less visible globally and presenting less of an overmatch to our adversaries. And that would translate into a different deterrent calculus and potentially therefore increase the likelihood of conflict.

Dempsey’s right that this conversation is about the scale of America’s enormous “overmatch” in military strength.  And remember that this isn’t the first time he’s made the point.

Sequestration clearly is not the right mechanism for drawing down defense spending, but the United States could responsibly achieve similar savings by adhering to our historical build-down trends of modest cuts sustained over time.

Comments

[El Sid]

"Nervos belli, pecuniam infinitam" as Cicero put it.

We're already turning into a multipolar world from an economic point of view, and where economic strength goes, military strength follows. Sequestration is just a minor detail set against the current strategic background. If a multipolar military world is not with us quite yet, it will be soon.

So the real question is whether we find ourselves in 1880 or 1910. By 1880 the global hyperpower of the day was struggling against economic stagnation in the middle of the Long Depression, whilst the economies of the emerging superpowers were going gangbusters. However that multipolar economy only really manifested itself at a military level - well, naval level - with the arrival of the disruptive technology of the dreadnought c1910. So the loss of overmatch happens most suddenly in areas with discontinuities of technology. Remote-piloted systems probably happened early enough for the West to retain a significant lead over the new boys on the block, but autonomous drones may be one of the first areas where the overmatch is lost. From the outside, things already look pretty even in cyber. Maybe C-802's becoming available to groups such as Hezbollah is the equivalent of the cheap infantry A2AD weapon - the Maxim gun - at a stretch you could say ASBMs are the equivalent of tanks.

Anyway, the important thing is that if you start thinking of a target like the Royal Navy in 1916, then you may manage your loss of overmatch in a different way to just the standard salami-slicing implied by your phrase "modest cuts sustained over time". I guess I'm saying something similar to Dempsey's rubber band analogy, only thinking a bit more about what shape it will take in the future. The Royal Navy at Jutland was still much more capable than it had been 50 years previously - but its advantage over the emerging powers had been much eroded by a combination of differential economic growth and a technological paradigm shift.

The one thing you don't want to be is the USSR of 1989 - still undefeated militarily but brought to its knees by the economic demands of keeping up with the Joneses.